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Molecular subtyping of bacterial isolates by characteriza-
tion of proteins or nucleic acids has been successfully applied
to aid epidemiologic investigations of foodborne disease
outbreaks since the initial use of plasmid fingerprinting
nearly 20 years ago (1,2). Since that time, several methods for
identifying restriction fragment length polymorphisms on
chromosomal DNA have been developed, and molecular
subtyping has become an essential component of epidemiologic
investigations of infectious diseases (3-10).
This widespread use of molecular typing has resulted in a
plethora of techniques and protocols for subtyping even the
same species of bacteria (11). Because each laboratory uses its
own protocols for molecular typing and designations of
patterns, the results cannot be compared with those of another
laboratory, even if both laboratories have used essentially the
same methods. This lack of comparability has greatly
diminished the power of molecular subtyping methods.
In 1993, during the investigation of an Escherichia coli
O157:H7 outbreak caused by contaminated hamburgers
served in a fast-food restaurant chain in the western United
States, Barrett et al. in our laboratory applied pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) to characterize clinical and food
isolates of E. coli O157:H7 and demonstrated its utility in
outbreak investigations (12). Subsequently, our laboratory
received numerous requests from state health departments
for subtyping E. coli O157:H7. The demand soon overwhelmed
our testing capacity, and delays in subtyping isolates meant
that results were mostly useful only for laboratory
confirmation of conclusions from epidemiologic investiga-
tions. We reasoned that decentralization of subtyping
activities and transfer of standardized molecular subtyping
methodology to public health laboratories should enable more
timely subtyping of clinical and food isolates. One result
would be information useful to epidemiologists while they
were investigating outbreaks. In addition, routine subtyping
of isolates of foodborne pathogenic bacteria received by public
health laboratories should lead to identification of outbreaks
not readily recognizable by other means. Use of standardized
subtyping methods would allow isolates to be compared from
different parts of the country, enabling recognition of
nationwide outbreaks attributable to a common source of
infection, particularly those in which cases are geographically
separated.
In 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), with the assistance of the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL), selected the state public health
laboratories in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington, and
Texas as area laboratories for a national molecular subtyping
network for foodborne bacterial disease surveillance. This
network later became known as PulseNet (13). Standardized
PFGE typing and pattern analysis technology would be
transferred to the area laboratories, which would assume
responsibility for subtyping foodborne pathogenic bacteria
from their states and providing subtyping service to
neighboring states that requested assistance. At about the
same time, CDC and five state health departments, as part of
a response to emerging infectious disease threats (14),
implemented an active foodborne disease surveillance
program called FoodNet (15). The objectives of FoodNet were
to accurately estimate the burden of foodborne disease in the
United States, investigate the sources of infection in
outbreaks and sporadic cases, and build public health
infrastructure for dealing with emerging foodborne disease
issues. In 1996, FoodNet included Minnesota, Oregon,
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Connecticut, and Georgia and selected counties in California.
Participants in FoodNet recognized the advantages offered by
PulseNet, and the public health laboratories in Oregon and
Georgia began participating in PulseNet. The first 5-day
workshop on standardized methods for PFGE for foodborne
pathogenic bacteria was held in January 1996. By early 2000,
PulseNet included 46 state public health laboratories, the
public health laboratories in New York City and Los Angeles
County, California, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Food Safety and Inspection Service Laboratory (USDA-FSIS)
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration laboratories in
the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (FDA-
CFSAN) and Center for Veterinary Medicine (Figure 1). In
addition, six provincial Canadian laboratories joined PulseNet
in 1999-2000; their participation is coordinated through the
National Laboratory for Enteric Pathogens, Canadian Science
Centre for Human and Animal Health Winnipeg, Manitoba.
As PulseNet’s capacity expands, the need for epidemio-
logic assessment of new information expands in parallel
because timely evaluation of clusters identified by the
network is critical and warranted. PulseNet’s laboratory
evaluation of isolates from clusters or outbreaks identified
through routine epidemiologic surveillance has already
demonstrated its value in early recognition of outbreaks and
rapid identification of their sources. A welcome consequence
is engendering close collaboration between epidemiologists
and microbiologists throughout the public health system.
Standard Protocols
During 1996 and early 1997, we evaluated the standard
protocol for E. coli O157:H7 at participating PulseNet
laboratories. The original protocol, similar to the one used by
Barrett et al. (12), required 3 to 4 days of testing; it involved
an overnight incubation for cell lysis and another for
restriction of chromosomal DNA. A set of 64 E. coli O157:H7
strains was compiled to evaluate the reproducibility of DNA
fingerprint patterns in different laboratories. This set was
sent to participating laboratories, which were asked to type
strains by using the standardized protocol and return the raw
electronic images of PFGE patterns to a common CDC
database for study. Data analysis showed that when the
standardized protocol is strictly followed by participating
laboratories, results are highly reproducible and DNA
patterns generated at different laboratories can be compared
(Table 1). Also included in this set were duplicates of nine
isolates to assess intralaboratory reproducibility of PFGE
patterns; the testing laboratories were unaware of the
duplicate strains until results were analyzed and reported.
For six of nine sets, all laboratories generated patterns that
were exact matches within each set. For each of the three
remaining sets of duplicates, one of seven laboratories did not
generate an exact match but matched the duplicates at 95%-
97% similarity.
Standardized Equipment for
Participating Laboratories
PulseNet laboratories use CHEF-DRII, CHEF-DRIII, or
CHEF-Mapper (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, CA) for
PFGE of restricted bacterial DNA. Although all three
instruments can run PulseNet protocols, CHEF-Mapper
allows greater flexibility in development of electrophoretic
separation conditions and nonlinear ramping. After
electrophoresis, the gels are stained with ethidium bromide,
and PFGE patterns are digitized in a TIFF format
(uncompressed .tif file) by using a Gel-Doc 1000 (replaced by
Gel-Doc 2000; Bio-Rad Laboratories) or other image
acquisition equipment capable of 768 x 640 pixels or higher
resolution. Molecular Analyst Fingerprinting Plus with Data
Sharing Tools (MAFP-DST; Bio-Rad Laboratories; sold as
GelCompar in Europe) is the software program used by
PulseNet laboratories for analysis of PFGE patterns. MAFP-
DST is being replaced with BioNumerics software (Applied
Figure 1. Locations of PulseNet
laboratories in the United States.
PulseNet participant states are
currently participating.  States
labeled PulseNet participants
2001 are expected to complete
the requirements for entry by
December 2001. The area labora-
tories provide surge capacity and
technical support to neighboring
states. FDA-CFSAN: U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, Cen-
ter for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition Laboratory; FDA-CVM:
U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion, Center for Veterinary Medi-
cine Laboratory; USDA-FSIS:
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food Safety and Inspection
Service Laboratory.Synopses
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Maths, Kortrijk, Belgium); the change-over will be completed
in 2001. Each PulseNet laboratory has all the above
equipment and has the capability to normalize the patterns,
compare them with other patterns, and maintain local
databases of PFGE patterns for each bacterial pathogen of
interest.
National Database of PFGE Patterns and
Associated Epidemiologic Information
A national database of PFGE patterns is being assembled
for foodborne bacterial pathogens. These databases reside on
a PulseNet server at CDC. For each bacterial pathogen, the
normalized PFGE pattern is associated with a pattern
database and a database of epidemiologic and clinical
information for isolates. One isolate may be associated with
more than one PFGE pattern in the database because
PulseNet protocols may call for the use of more than one
restriction enzyme to achieve appropriate discrimination
between epidemiologically unrelated isolates. The E. coli
O157:H7 database is functional; databases for nontyphoidal
Salmonella serotypes and Listeria monocytogenes are under
construction.
Seven PulseNet laboratories (four state public health
laboratories, FDA-CFSAN, USDA-FSIS, and CDC) have
direct access to the PulseNet database server through the
Internet, enabling them to submit normalized PFGE patterns
and associated epidemiologic information. (The DST version
of the Molecular Analyst software creates a special “bundle”
file for comparison with the national database.) Laboratories
query the national database for identical matches or closely
related patterns (>95% related under specified conditions). If
identical or close matches to the submitted patterns are
found, the submitting laboratory can access epidemiologic
information associated with those patterns from the text
database. When a PulseNet participating laboratory logs on
to the PulseNet server, it will display a “recent match”
message if two or more laboratories submit identical or closely
related patterns within a specified time. This alert provides
an early warning to PulseNet laboratories about possible
multisite foodborne disease outbreaks.
PulseNet laboratories that do not yet have direct online
access to the PulseNet server may still electronically submit
raw TIFF images and normalized PFGE patterns (bundle
files) to the PulseNet database administration team by e-mail
or through file transfer protocols (ftp). The team compares the
submitted patterns with those in the national database and e-
mails the results to the submitting laboratory as quickly as
possible. We expect that direct access to the PulseNet server
will be available to all participating laboratories that have
satisfactorily completed certification requirements by June
30, 2001.
Developing Standardized Protocols
Standardized protocols for foodborne bacterial pathogens
were developed in priority order based on the ability of PFGE
to discriminate among strains of the organism and the
epidemiologic utility of the resulting data. Standardized
PFGE protocols have been developed for E. coli O157:H7,
Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium, L. monocytoge-
nes, and Shigella species. The S. Typhimurium protocol is
applicable to most other nontyphoidal Salmonella serotypes,
including S. Enteritidis. However, neither PFGE nor other
molecular subtyping methods provide acceptable discrimina-
tion among strains of this highly clonal serotype. Standard
PFGE protocols for Campylobacter jejuni, C. coli, and
Clostridium perfringens (7) are being developed and
validated. Although C. jejuni and C. coli infections are
common, developing a standardized PFGE protocol for these
organisms was not a high priority because they infrequently
cause outbreaks. On the other hand, although outbreaks of C.
perfringens infections are seldom widespread, state and local
public health laboratories requested a standardized
subtyping protocol to assist with local outbreak investiga-
tions. All PulseNet protocols are 1-day procedures based on
the PFGE protocol developed by the Washington State Public
Health Laboratory in response to the need for more rapid
techniques (16). All new protocols and modifications of
existing protocols are evaluated initially at the developing
laboratory, followed by a second evaluation at CDC, alpha-
testing at one or two PulseNet laboratories, and beta-testing
at several PulseNet laboratories before they are adopted as
official PulseNet protocols. Evaluation criteria include
reproducibility of patterns, appropriateness of the strain used
as the reference standard, and robustness of the procedure.
Once a protocol is officially adopted, no changes can be made
except by a petition to CDC’s PulseNet Task Force, discussion
of the proposed changes, and adoption of the proposal by
PulseNet laboratories. The PulseNet Task Force at CDC is
composed of personnel who carry out PulseNet-related
activities. The Task Force members develop and evaluate
protocols, provide technical support for participating
laboratories, organize and conduct training workshops,
administer the certification program and proficiency testing
program, and maintain the national databases of PFGE
patterns for the bacteria under surveillance in PulseNet.
Quality Control and Assurance Program
A quality assurance program has been instituted for
PulseNet to ensure the integrity of results obtained with the
standardized PFGE techniques. This program requires strict
adherence to the standardized PFGE protocols (17). In
addition, the quality assurance program consists of standards
for training, analytical procedures, documentation, and
Table 1. Interlaboratory reproducibility of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns of 64 Escherichia coli isolates by eight laboratories following the
PulseNet standardized protocol
                                                                    Laboratory (%)
Result    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8
Matched expected pattern 64/64a 63/63 59/63 62/64 62/64 62/64 61/64 61/64
(100) (100) (93.7) (96.9) (96.9) (96.9) (95.3) (95.3)
< 1-band difference from expected pattern 64/64 63/63 62/63 64/64 63/64 64/64 64/64 64/64
(100) (100) (98.4) (100) (98.4) (100) (100) (100)
aValues represent no. of patterns fitting in the specified category/no. of isolates tested.Synopses
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equipment; standard operating procedures; an initial
certification set of isolates for each organism; and an ongoing
proficiency testing program. The standards detail the
minimum requirements a laboratory must meet for training
personnel, analytical procedures, documentation, equipment
calibration and maintenance, proficiency testing, and review
of results. The laboratory standard operating procedures
describe procedures for record keeping, equipment mainte-
nance, gel image acquisition, data analysis, and administra-
tive policies. The certification sets consist of isolates with
known patterns, which are sent to each laboratory.
Laboratories type the isolates by the standardized protocol
and send the gel images to the PulseNet National Database
Administration Team for review. This team, part of the
PulseNet Task Force, is responsible for maintaining and
updating the PFGE pattern databases for foodborne disease-
causing bacteria. Team members review new patterns
submitted to the databases and verify matches. In addition,
this team evaluates the certification data submitted by
PulseNet laboratories. Laboratories with DST version of the
MAFP software also analyze their gel images and send the
results (bundle files) to the PulseNet National Database
Administration Team for review. This team checks gel images
and bundle files against the master certification set to ensure
that the laboratory has obtained the correct patterns.
Successful completion of the certification set allows PulseNet-
affiliated laboratories to compare results with the National
Database. As part of the proficiency testing program,
laboratories will be sent a combination of isolates and TIFF
files on a semiannual basis both to test the laboratory’s ability
to perform the standardized protocol correctly and to ensure
that data analysis is consistent from laboratory to laboratory.
A quality assurance and control manual, being
developed, will describe standardized training, laboratory
and administrative procedures, and policies. A proficiency
testing manual, also in preparation, is designed to maintain
the reproducibility of patterns and consistency in analysis of
patterns that make PulseNet a valuable ally for
epidemiologists.
Laboratories joining PulseNet are sent the standardized
PFGE protocols and certification sets appropriate to the
organism(s) being tested. Appropriate training is scheduled
and follow-up is provided by means of the certification sets
and the regularly scheduled proficiency testing program. An
annual meeting enables microbiologists from participating
PulseNet laboratories to discuss new protocols and software
upgrades and exchange information on problems and
solutions.
Standardized Nomenclature for PFGE Patterns
A major problem in comparing and interpreting
molecular subtyping information from different laboratories
has been the lack of a universal naming system for PFGE
patterns. In response, we have developed a standardized
nomenclature system for designating PFGE patterns in
PulseNet. Each unique pattern in the database is represented
by a 10-character code as follows:
XXXYYY.0000
The first three characters in the code represent the bacterial
pathogen, the next three characters denote the enzyme used
for DNA restriction, and the last four characters represent the
pattern designation. For example, in the pattern designation
EXHA26.0026, EXH represents E. coli O157:H7, A26
represents restriction endonuclease AvrII, and 0026 is the
pattern number. Because the pattern numbers are assigned
sequentially to unique patterns, no evolutionary, phylogenet-
ic, or clonal relationships should be implied from the order of
pattern numbers.
A priority order has been developed for inclusion of
foodborne bacterial pathogens in PulseNet (Table 2). The
prioritization takes into account the availability of an
acceptable molecular subtyping method for a pathogen,
severity of disease caused by that pathogen, propensity for the
pathogen to cause outbreaks, and the potential for
recognizing outbreaks and taking preventive action by
routine subtyping.
Role of PulseNet in Outbreak Investigations
PulseNet plays several roles in detecting, investigating,
and controlling outbreaks. Identification by PulseNet of an
increase in a specific subtype of a pathogen may be an early
indication of an outbreak. PFGE patterns submitted to the
national database by participating laboratories may link
apparently unrelated cases that are geographically dispersed.
Once a cluster is detected through PulseNet, an epidemiologic
investigation is initiated to determine if there is a common
source. This epidemiologic investigation may be guided by the
PFGE subtypes identified through PulseNet. PulseNet can
identify outlier cases in other areas and define the geographic
scope of the outbreak. If a common food source is identified
and the pathogen is isolated from that food, subtyping helps
confirm it as the outbreak strain. Finally, once control
measures are instituted, PulseNet can help confirm that the
outbreak is over by showing a substantial decrease in circulation
of the outbreak strain in the affected communities. The following
examples illustrate these PulseNet functions.
In 1996, epidemiologists at the Washington State and
Seattle-King County health departments traced an outbreak
of E. coli O157:H7 infections in four states and one Canadian
province to commercial unpasteurized apple juice. Of 70
persons identified as part of this outbreak, 25 required
hospitalization, 14 had hemolytic uremic syndrome, and one
died. DNA fingerprinting by PFGE at the Washington State
Public Health Laboratory, a PulseNet area laboratory,
showed that isolates from patients and the apple juice were
the same strain. Prompt recognition of the apple juice as the
source of this outbreak resulted in rapid recall of the widely
distributed product (18).
Table 2. Priority order for inclusion of foodborne bacterial pathogens
in PulseNet
Pathogen Expected year of inclusion
Escherichia coli O157:H7 1997
Nontyphoidal Salmonella serotypes 1998
Listeria monocytogenes 1999
Shigella sonnei 1999
Clostridium perfringens 2001
Campylobacter jejuni 2001
Vibrio parahaemolyticus 2001
V. cholerae 2001
Clostridium botulinum 2002
Other pathogenic E. coli 2002
Yersinia enterocolitica 2003Synopses
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In 1997, the Colorado State Public Health Laboratory,
which had just initiated PFGE typing of E. coli O157:H7,
identified a cluster of 14 ill persons whose E. coli O157:H7
isolates had matching PFGE patterns. About the same time,
the USDA laboratory isolated an E. coli O157:H7 strain from
a ground beef patty from the same package as a patty eaten by
an ill person. DNA fingerprinting by PFGE on the human
isolate from Colorado and the food isolate from USDA-FSIS
were generated by the PulseNet standardized protocol. The
PFGE patterns were transmitted electronically to CDC via
the Internet, where they were found to be indistinguishable.
This outbreak pattern was then transmitted to PulseNet sites
and compared with patterns from >300 other recent E. coli
O157:H7 isolates. No matching patterns were found other
than one case in Kentucky, providing strong evidence that the
outbreak was not nationwide.
In May 1998, PulseNet facilitated the investigation of
two clusters of E. coli O157:H7 infections in the northeastern
United States. Timely fingerprinting of E. coli O157:H7
isolates by the Massachusetts Area Laboratory for PulseNet
and other PulseNet laboratories in that region revealed two
simultaneous clusters of E. coli O157:H7 infections (32
isolates in four of five states with one PFGE pattern and 25
isolates in all of five states with a second PFGE pattern), one
of which could be traced to two supermarkets that received
ground beef from the same distributor. Without assistance
from PulseNet, epidemiologists would have found it difficult
to identify cases associated with each cluster.
Also in May 1998, the state public health departments in
both Illinois and Pennsylvania informed CDC about increases
in  Salmonella Agona infections. Serotype-specific surveil-
lance data from other states quickly confirmed that 10 states
had increases in S. Agona infections. A national outbreak of
S. Agona was occurring, with no obvious source. Subsequent-
ly, the outbreak was traced to contaminated ready-to-eat
toasted oats cereal product from a food-processing facility in
Minnesota (19). PulseNet laboratories helped in this
investigation by distinguishing cases that were associated
with the outbreak from those that were not. In addition,
timely PFGE typing of S. Agona by PulseNet laboratories
helped identify outbreak-associated cases in states where the
contaminated product was not initially thought to have been
distributed. PFGE subtyping of S. Agona isolates was
important in confirming the successful control of the
outbreak. Not only did the number of reported isolates return
to baseline, but also the outbreak strain disappeared. By the
time this investigation was completed, PulseNet laboratories
had typed >1,000 isolates of S. Agona. Four hundred nine
cases (one fatal) in 23 states were linked to this outbreak
(CDC, unpub. data).
From October 20 to November 9, 1998, health officials in
Connecticut, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee reported
increases in Listeria infections in their states (20). PFGE
typing by PulseNet laboratories showed that several case
isolates from different states had indistinguishable DNA
fingerprints. On further investigation, 101 Listeria infections
(including 15 perinatal infections) with bacteria having the
same or highly similar DNA fingerprints were identified in 22
states. Fifteen deaths and six miscarriages or stillbirths were
reported among patients who were infected with the outbreak
strain. This outbreak was traced to contaminated hot dogs
and sandwich meat produced at a single large meat-processing
plant in Michigan (21). After the company voluntarily
recalled the implicated lots of product and suspended
production, the outbreak rapidly ended.
Surveillance for Foodborne Outbreaks
Twenty years ago, most foodborne outbreaks were local
problems that typically resulted from improper food-handling
practices. Outbreaks were often associated with individual
restaurants or social events and often came to the attention of
local public health officials through calls from affected
persons. These persons, who may have known others who had
become ill after eating a shared meal or visiting the same
restaurant, provided health officials with much of the
information needed to begin an investigation.
Today, foodborne disease outbreaks commonly involve
widely distributed food products that are contaminated before
distribution, resulting in cases that are spread over several
states or countries. It is less common for ill persons to know
others who were ill or to be able to identify a likely source of
their infection. For these reasons, it is becoming increasingly
important to be able to identify potential common exposures
through DNA fingerprinting of patient isolates.
For foodborne outbreak surveillance to be effective,
isolates must be subtyped routinely and the data analyzed
promptly at the local level. Clusters can often be detected
locally that could not have been identified by traditional
epidemiologic methods alone. This is especially true of
infections with common pathogens such as S. Typhimurium,
which occur so frequently that clusters may be hidden among
sporadic cases. For S. Typhimurium isolates received by the
microbiology laboratory at the Minnesota Department of
Health from August 14 to September 14, 1995, temporal
distribution did not suggest any obvious clustering, but the
distribution of PFGE subtypes suggested multiple common
sources with continuing exposures (Figure 2). Epidemiologic
investigation ultimately linked three of the subtypes to local
restaurants, where exposure to S. Typhimurium occurred
throughout the month (Jeffrey B. Bender, pers. comm.). Without
subtyping data, it would have been very difficult to associate
cases with exposures occurring over such a prolonged period.
In September 1998, the Minnesota state public health
laboratory informed other PulseNet laboratories that it was
investigating two clusters of Shigella sonnei infections
associated with restaurants in Minnesota and asked if other
states had observed increases in S. sonnei infections or
S. sonnei isolates with the outbreak PFGE pattern. The Los
Angeles County public health department immediately
responded that it was also investigating restaurant-
associated outbreaks of S. sonnei and that the PFGE pattern
of their outbreak strain was very similar to the Minnesota
pattern. Epidemiologic and laboratory investigations ulti-
mately determined that outbreaks in Massachusetts, Florida,
and two Canadian provinces were linked to the Minnesota
and Los Angeles outbreaks. With the assistance of the FDA’s
outbreak trace-back and coordination group, parsley
imported from Mexico was identified as the common vehicle
(22). Mexican and U.S. authorities inspected the parsley farm
and recommended changes in growing and harvesting
practices to prevent recurrence of the problem. Rapid sharing
of PFGE subtyping data through PulseNet played a critical
role in linking these apparently unrelated outbreaks and
identifying a common vehicle.Synopses
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The use of molecular subtyping as part of routine
surveillance has benefits beyond outbreak detection.
Temporal clustering of unrelated cases is not uncommon, and
without molecular subtyping, valuable public health
resources can be wasted investigating pseudo-outbreaks. In
June and July 1994, an outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 infections
was suspected when the New Jersey Department of Health
and Senior Services received reports of 48 culture-confirmed
cases; only four were reported during the same period in 1993
(23). PFGE subtyping found most isolates to have unique
patterns, indicating that a large outbreak was unlikely. The
probable reason for the sudden increase in case reports was
the concomitant increase in the number of laboratories
culturing stools for E. coli O157:H7 (Figure 3).
Although PulseNet has proven invaluable in detecting
foodborne disease outbreaks and facilitating their investiga-
tion, molecular subtyping is an adjunct to epidemiologic
investigation and not a replacement for it. The observation
that isolates from two or more persons have indistinguishable
PFGE patterns should not be considered proof that the
persons had a common exposure, merely that the isolates in
question share a common ancestry. Moreover, outbreaks can
be caused by more than one subtype, so that differences in
PFGE pattern alone cannot prove that isolates did not have a
common source (24,25).
Requirements for Effective Functioning
Although the area laboratories are set up to assist
neighboring state public health laboratories that are not
PulseNet participants, every state must have PFGE
subtyping capacity for optimum performance of the network.
A dramatic indication of this was provided during the 1997
ground beef-associated E. coli O157:H7 outbreak in Colorado.
When the outbreak pattern was posted on PulseNet ListServ,
most laboratories that were network participants responded
within 48 hours that they had no matching PFGE patterns
from recent E. coli O157:H7 isolates. In contrast, it took more
than 2 months to identify a case in Kentucky (not a PulseNet
participant state in 1997) that was related to the Colorado
outbreak. The Association of Public Health Laboratories has
determined that PulseNet participation is a core capacity for
all state and territorial public health departments in the
United States.
For the network to work efficiently in detecting foodborne
disease outbreaks through routine surveillance, PulseNet
laboratories must perform, at a minimum, routine PFGE
subtyping of E. coli O157:H7 and L. monocytogenes as soon as
isolates are received. In addition, they must perform PFGE
subtyping of other foodborne pathogenic bacteria (Campylo-
bacter jejuni and C. coli, Salmonella serotypes, Shigella spp.,
Bacillus cereus,  Vibrio cholerae,  V. parahaemolyticus,
V. vulnificus, Clostridium botulinum, C. perfringens, Yersinia
enterocolitica) rapidly when the number of isolates received
by the laboratory exceeds the expected number for that
period. Unfortunately, microbiologists at state and local
public health laboratories often have responsibilities for all
pathogenic bacteria and may not be able to type incoming
isolates of foodborne pathogenic bacteria in a timely manner.
In addition, like  public health surveillance in general, PulseNet
Figure 3. Reported cases of culture-confirmed Escherichia coli
O157:H7 infection and percentage of surveyed laboratories routinely
testing all stool specimens for E. coli O157:H7, New Jersey, January
1991 through July 1994 (10).
Figure 2. Distribution by
date and pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis subtype
of  Salmonella ser.
Typhimurium isolates
received by the Minne-
sota Department of
Health, August 14-Sep-
tember 14, 1995. Data
provided by Jeffrey
Bender and John Besser,
Minnesota Department
of Health.Synopses
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depends on physicians requesting culture of patient
specimens if a bacterial infection is suspected and the clinical
diagnostic laboratory promptly forwarding isolates to the
public health laboratory for typing.
PulseNet relies on the cooperation of all participants in
typing foodborne pathogenic bacteria by strict adherence to
the standard protocol. Without such a total commitment,
PFGE patterns from different PulseNet laboratories could not
be compared to ascertain which cases are associated with a
specific outbreak. The importance of this was underscored by
a recent experience. One PulseNet laboratory had decided to
change the PulseNet protocol for S. Typhimurium and was
using a variation of the standard protocol. A cluster of
S. Typhimurium cases was detected in that state, and PFGE
analysis confirmed that many of the isolates were
indistinguishable. However, when attempts were made to
determine if an increase in S. Typhimurium infections in
neighboring states were related to the cluster, the PFGE
patterns could not be compared. This caused a delay of several
days in the investigation because isolates from the first state
had to be re-typed by the standardized protocol.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Elbasha et al. recently compared the costs and benefits of
PulseNet’s molecular subtyping-based surveillance system,
using as an example the Colorado state public health
laboratory’s investigation of the 1997 E. coli O157:H7
outbreak in which contaminated frozen hamburger patties
were implicated (26). If 15 cases were averted by the recall of
potentially contaminated ground beef, the PulseNet system
in Colorado would have recovered all costs of start-up and 5
years of operation. These authors point out that the system
becomes even more cost-effective if one takes into account
resources that would have been wasted to investigate apparent
increases in sporadic cases of E. coli O157:H7 infections.
The Growth and Future of PulseNet
Within a very short time, PulseNet has grown beyond
expectations and has convincingly demonstrated its
effectiveness as a tool for foodborne disease surveillance. It
began with one pathogen (E. coli O157:H7) and 10
participating laboratories in 1996 that submitted 191 PFGE
patterns to the PulseNet database during that year. In 1999,
four pathogens (E. coli O157:H7, Salmonella, Shigella, and
Listeria monocytogenes) were tracked through PulseNet and
>9,500 patterns were submitted to the PulseNet database.
State and local public health laboratories contributed >78% of
the patterns to the PulseNet database (Figure 4). As the FDA
are increasing the number of laboratories that perform PFGE
subtyping using PulseNet protocols, and the USDA are
setting up their own PulseNet-compatible local networks,
their contributions to the PulseNet database will no doubt
substantially increase. In addition, the representation of
PFGE patterns in the PulseNet databases will increase for
pathogenic bacteria isolated from foods.
As more public health laboratories at the local and state
levels join PulseNet, the role of the area laboratories is
changing. The area laboratories provide training and
consultation to neighboring PulseNet laboratories, coordinate
multistate outbreak investigations when requested, and
Figure 4. Sources of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns
submitted to PulseNet in 1999.
provide surge capacity for neighboring PulseNet laboratories.
Three additional area laboratories, in Michigan, Utah, and
Virginia, were designated in 2000, bringing the total number
to seven.
Canada is already an active participant, and internation-
al expansion of the network with partners in Mexico, South
America, and Europe is anticipated. The long-term vision for
PulseNet is a global network of public health laboratories
working with food regulatory agencies and industry to
improve food safety worldwide.
Finally, we recognize that the methods currently used for
subtyping and data analysis will not always be state-of-the-
art. We are working to develop, evaluate, and validate DNA
sequencing-based subtyping methods for foodborne patho-
gens. These methods will be gradually implemented in the
network, and compatibility will be maintained with existing
PFGE data. We are also working with software developers to
implement new versions of pattern analysis software and
DNA sequence comparison software to improve pattern
matching, automate pattern normalization and sequence
alignment, and reduce subjectivity in subtype comparisons.
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